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A B S T R A C T
We investigate why top performing hedge funds are successful. We find evidence that top performing hedge
funds follow a different strategy than mediocre performing hedge funds as they accept risk factors that do and
avoid factors than do not anticipate the troubling economic conditions prevailing after 2006. Holding alpha
performance constant, top performing funds avoid relying on passive investment in illiquid investments but earn
risk premiums by accepting market risk. Additionally, they seem able to exploit fleeting opportunities leading to
momentum profits while closing losing strategies thereby avoiding momentum reversal.
1. Introduction
The hedge fund industry continues to attract enormous sums of
money. For example, BarclayHedge reports that the global hedge fund
industry has more than $2.9 trillion of assets under management as of
December 2018.1 Yet, due to the light regulatory nature of the industry,
we know little about how these assets are managed or what strategies
hedge fund managers pursue.
We examine the structure of significant risk factors that explain the
out of sample net excess returns of successful hedge funds to develop
some information concerning the strategies followed by successful
hedge funds. This is a departure from prior work that examines the fund
characteristics (Boyson (2008), the sex of managers (Aggarwal &
Boyson, 2016) or the fee structures (Aggarwal, Naveen, & Naik, 2009)
of hedge funds, see El Kalak, Azevedo, and Hudson (2016b) for a review
of managerial characteristics of hedge funds and see El Kalak, Azevedo,
and Hudson (2016a) for a review of hedge fund risk management
practices. In other words, rather than examine the visible character-
istics, we examine the risk factors accepted by hedge funds to uncover
information concerning the behaviour of hedge funds. This paper's aims
are consistent with Stafylas, Anderson, and Uddin (2018) who look at
hedge fund behaviour by hedge fund style under different market
conditions. Our paper is different however as we look at changes in
aggregate hedge fund behaviour according to verified performance
level as we move through the difficult market conditions associated
with the 2007 liquidity crisis and the 2008–09 recession.
To investigate top hedge funds, we need to identify top performing
funds and to determine how long their superior performance persists.
Therefore, we need to address two prerequisite questions, namely, do
hedge funds perform as well as market benchmarks and, for the top
performing funds, does top performance persist? We need to know
whether hedge funds, as a class, outperform, perform as well, or un-
derperform the market to appreciate what top performance means. We
also need to know how long the superior performance of top hedge
funds persists to identify the data we need to interrogate the successful
strategies followed by these hedge funds.
The issues highlighted above have important implications; it is
therefore not surprising that a lot of attention has been paid to technical
issues. There is now substantial evidence that the underlying generating
processes of the distributions of hedge fund returns are fat tailed and
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nonlinear. When fund returns are not normally distributed mean and
standard deviation are not enough to describe the return distribution.
Researchers therefore sought to replace traditional risk measures with
risk measures that incorporate higher moments of the return distribu-
tions to analyse tail risk (see for example Liang & Park, 2007, 2010). To
address the issue of nonlinearity, some researchers have turned to non-
parametric techniques. Non-parametric methods allow for non-normal
distribution of returns and non-linear dependence with risk factors.
Recently, the non-parametric literature has used the estimated density
function in the context of stochastic dominance analysis. It is in this
strand of the literature that this paper is related to.
The present study relates to work by Bali, Brown, and Demirtas
(2013) who use an almost stochastic dominance approach and the
manipulation proof performance measure MPPM to examine the re-
lative performance of hedge fund portfolios. Unlike the prior literature
which assume hedge fund returns are i.i.d., we use non-parametric
techniques that allow us to conduct formal statistical tests that are ro-
bust to serial and cross dependence among hedge funds return dis-
tributions. Specifically, we employ stochastic dominance tests to de-
termine if the hedge fund industry outperformed or underperformed the
market in recent years and whether and for how long top performing
funds persistently outperform mediocre performing hedge funds using
the methods proposed by Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang (2005). The
authors propose consistent tests for stochastic dominance under a
general sampling scheme that includes serial and cross dependence
among hedge funds distributions. The test statistic requires the use of
empirical distribution functions of the compared hedge fund strategies.
Linton et al. (2005) suggest using resampling methods to approximate
the asymptotic distribution of the test to produce consistent estimates of
the critical values of the test.
In the literature, a few related papers use the stochastic dominance
principle in the context of hedge fund portfolio management. For ex-
ample, Wong, Phoon, and Lean (2008) employ the stochastic dom-
inance approach to rank the performance of Asian hedge funds. Simi-
larly, Sedzro (2009) compare the Sharpe ratio, modified Sharpe ratio
and DEA performance measures using stochastic dominance metho-
dology. Abhyankar, Hoz, and Zhao (2008) compare value versus
growth strategies. In a related study, Fong, Wong, and Lean (2005) use
stochastic dominance test in the context of asset-pricing.
However, these empirical works use stochastic dominance tests that
work well under the i.i.d. assumption but are not suitable for many
financial assets. For example, the popular stochastic dominance test
suggested by Davidson and Duclos (2000) used in most of these studies
use an inference procedure that is invalid when the assumption of i.i.d.
does not hold. Several studies (see Brooks & Kat, 2002) have shown that
the distributions of hedge fund returns are substantially different from
i.i.d. since they exhibit high volatility and highly significant positive
first order autocorrelation. Bali et al. (2013) also find cross dependence
with stock markets. All these features which are intrinsic in the data at
hand invalidate the use of a stochastic dominance tests that are not
robust to departure from the i.i.d. assumption.
Another possible drawback of the related literature is that these
empirical works compares the probability distribution functions of
hedge fund portfolios only at a fixed number of arbitrarily chosen
points. This can lead to lower power of the inference procedure in cases
where the violation of the null hypothesis occurs on some subinterval
lying between the evaluation points used in the test. In general, sto-
chastic dominance tests may prove unreliable if the dominance condi-
tions are not satisfied for the points that are not considered in the
analysis.
Unlike related studies, the inference procedure adopted in this
paper allows us to overcome the above issues by examining cumulates
of the entire empirical distribution. The adopted stochastic dominance
inference procedure is robust to departures of cross-dependency be-
tween random variables and serial correlation. It is also robust to un-
conditional heteroscedasticity. This constitutes a significant departure
from the traditional stochastic dominance inference procedures which
rely on the problematic i.i.d. assumption of hedge fund return dis-
tributions.
Once identifying that hedge funds perform as well as the market and
finding that top performance persists at least for six months, we proceed
to the main empirical issue by employing quantile regressions to ex-
amine the risk factors accepted by top and mediocre performing funds.
Standard regression specifications for hedge funds used in the related
literature model the conditional expectation of returns. However, these
regression models describe only the average relationship of hedge fund
returns with the set of risk factors. This approach might not be adequate
due to the characteristics of hedge fund returns. The literature (see, for
example, Brooks & Kat, 2002) has acknowledged that, due to their
highly dynamic nature, hedge fund returns exhibit a high degree of non-
normality, fat tails, excess kurtosis and skewness. In the presence of
these characteristics the conditional mean approach may not capture
the effect of risk factors on the entire distribution of returns and may
provide estimates which are not robust.
Unlike standard regression analysis, quantile regressions examine
the quantile response of the hedge fund return at say the 25th quantile,
as the values of the independent variables change. Quantile regressions
do this for all quantiles, or in other words, the whole distribution of the
dependent variable, thereby providing a much richer set of information
concerning how the excess return of hedge funds respond to different
sources of systematic risk. To comprehend this huge amount of in-
formation, we graph the response by quantile of the excess hedge fund
return to changes in each of the systematic risk factors.
Accordingly, our empirical investigation proceeds in four stages.
First, we examine whether hedge funds have performed as well as
several market benchmarks. We find that despite the relatively low
hedge fund returns in recent years, the market does not second order
stochastically dominate hedge funds from January 2001 to December
2012.
Second, we examine whether top performing hedge funds persis-
tently outperform mediocre performing hedge funds out of sample even
if we include the challenging economic conditions of recent years. We
find that the top performing quintile of hedge funds does second order
stochastically dominate the mediocre performing third quintile out of
sample. However, this superior performance persists for only six
months, far less than the two (Gonzalez, Papageorgiou, & Skinner,
2016; Boyson, 2008) or three years (Ammann, Huber, & Schmit, 2013)
reported earlier by authors who use less robust parametric techniques.
In any event we conclude that top performing funds persistently out-
perform mediocre funds for at least six months.
Third, we examine the role liquidity as well as other risk factors,
such as momentum, play in achieving net excess rates of return out of
sample. We do this for funds of verified superior and mediocre per-
formance to determine whether top performing funds take on a dis-
tinctively different risk profile, implying they follow a distinctive
strategy, than mediocre performing funds. An important caveat is that
we are examining these factors as slope coefficients estimated via
quantile regression methods, so we must assume alpha performance is
constant. We find that top performing fund returns are driven by a
different risk profile than is evident for more modestly performing
funds. Specifically, the excess returns of top performing funds are sig-
nificantly related to the market premium and momentum across a
broad range of quantiles and only for the top quintal, liquidity and
lookback volatility. In contrast, the excess returns for mediocre funds
are also related to many other factors across a broad range of quantiles
including not only the market premium and momentum, but also the
SMB and HML Fama French factors. Moreover, unlike top performing
funds, liquidity is a significant factor for a broader range of quantiles
for mediocre performing funds. Interestingly, momentum reversal is
significantly negative for the lowest quantile of mediocre performing
funds suggesting that one reason why mediocre funds do less well than
top funds is that they are slow to close out a losing strategy.
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Fourth, we investigate the behaviour of risk factors accepted by top
and mediocre performing hedge funds by examining the time series
values of their coefficients by quantile as we move from the robust
economic conditions that prevailed prior to 2007 to the recessionary
and slow growth conditions that have evolved since. We find that for
the top performing funds, the dispersion of coefficient values for the
market return and for the momentum factors, factors that are sig-
nificant throughout a broad range of quintiles for top performing funds,
increase in the months leading up to the financial crisis period but by
2008, the confidence envelope for coefficient values return to a more
normal range. Meanwhile for mediocre performing funds, the con-
fidence envelops for market risk and momentum factors also widen in
2006 but unlike top performing funds, the confidence envelope does
not narrow during the financial crisis. Moreover, for third quintile
performing funds, the dispersion of coefficient values for other sig-
nificant factors, such as SMB and HML increase before and continue
during the 2008 recession. This suggests that the market and the mo-
mentum factors, factors that are significant in explaining top fund
performance, anticipate the liquidity crisis and subsequent recession
whereas the factors that significantly explain mediocre hedge fund
performance, do not fully anticipate the liquidity crisis and subsequent
recession and merely react to coincident events.
Stivers and Sun (2010) also find that the momentum factor is pro-
cyclical, but they do not examine the role of other factors, such as li-
quidity. Moreover, these results also support Kacperczyk,
Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) who find evidence that market
timing is a task that top performing mutual fund managers can execute.
Additionally, we uncover evidence of what systematic risk factors top
funds exploit and what systematic risk factors they avoid.
A possible drawback of our stochastic dominance analysis is that
preserving the characteristics of the data may not control for the issue
of returns smoothing. Many scholars have observed that one con-
sequence of smoothing is to make hedge funds returns appear less risky.
To address this important issue, the stochastic dominance analysis is
repeated using unsmoothed hedge fund return data.2 We find that our
results are replicated using unsmoothed data. Specifically, hedge funds
perform at least as well as the market, top performance persist for at
least six months and mediocre performing funds accept more risk fac-
tors than top performing funds that appear to react rather than antici-
pate future economic events..
In Section 2 we report some related literature while Section 3 de-
scribes the data. Our empirical analysis proceeds in Sections 4 and 5
while Section 6 adjusts for return smoothing. Section 7 summarizes and
concludes.
2. Literature review
The case for hedge funds “beating” the market is not clear.
Weighing up all the evidence, Stulz (2007) concludes that hedge funds
offer returns commensurate with risk once hedge fund manager com-
pensation is accounted for. More recently, Dichev and Yu (2011)
document a large reduction in buy and hold returns for a very large
sample of hedge and CTA funds from on average 18.7% for 1980 to
1994, to 9.5% from 1995 to 2008. As discussed later in detail, our more
recent sample, from January 31, 2001 to December 31, 2012, reports
that hedge fund returns are even lower, obtaining only 37 basis points
per month (4.5% per year) net rate of return on average. Moreover, Bali
et al. (2013) find that only the long short equity hedge and emerging
market hedge fund indices outperformed the S&P500 in recent years.
Clearly, it is possible that the hedge fund industry is entering a mature
phase and prior conclusions concerning the performance of the hedge
fund industry may no longer apply. This has an impact on this paper
because we are interested in developing insights of the strategies fol-
lowed by successful fund managers and not of the strategies followed by
the best fund managers in an underperforming asset class.
Another strand of the hedge fund literature criticizes the use of
common performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio, alpha and
information ratio. Amin and Kat (2003) question the use of these
measures as they assume normally distributed returns and/or linear
relations with market risk factors. This strand of research inspired
proposals for a wide variety of alternative performance measures pur-
porting to resolve issues of measuring performance in the face of non-
normal returns. However, Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) find that the
ranking of hedge funds by the Sharpe ratio is virtually identical to
twelve alternative performance measures. Moreover, Bali et al. (2013)
finds that traditional mean variance measures (e.g. Sharpe and Traynor
ratios) and downside adjusted risk measures (e.g. VAR and Sortino
ratios) “does not generate a robust, consistent ranking among hedge
fund strategy's”. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007) point
out that common performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio, alpha
and information ratio can be subject to manipulation, deliberate or
otherwise. These issues imply that the use of these performance mea-
sures can obtain misleading conclusions. Goetzmann et al. (2007) then
go on to develop the manipulation proof performance measure MPPM,
so called because this performance measure is resistant to manipula-
tion. According to Brown, Kang, In, and Lee (2010) the MPPM is more
correct than other measures, including measures that are designed to
incorporate tail risk such as the Sortino and the VAR approaches. Still,
Billio, Jannin, Maillet, and Pelizzon (2013) discover that the MPPM
measure, especially when using lower risk aversion parameters, is in-
fluenced by the mean of returns and does not fully consider other
moments of the distribution of returns such as skewness and kurtosis.
To adjust for this, and to provide a performance measure resistance to
manipulation that Brown et al. (2010) suggests is the most accurate, we
compile MPPM statistics using a broad range of risk aversion para-
meters.
Some research strongly supports persistence, other research is more
equivocal. Formed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) alphas, Ammann et al.
(2013) find three years while Boyson (2008) and Gonzalez et al. (2016)
find two years of performance persistence for top funds. Agarwal and
Naik (2000) note that a two-period model for performance persistence
can be inadequate when hedge funds have significant lock-up periods.
Using a more exacting multi-period setting, they find performance
persistence is short term in nature. Jagannathan, Malakhov, and
Novikov (2010) find performance persistence only for top and not for
poorly performing funds suggesting that performance persistence is
related to superior management talent. Ammann et al. (2013) find that
strategy distinctiveness as suggested by Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012) is
the strongest predictor of performance persistence while Boyson (2008)
finds that persistence is particularly strong among small and relatively
young funds with a track record of delivering alpha. Fung, Hsieh, Naik,
and Ramadorai (2008) find that funds of hedge funds with statistically
significant alpha are more likely to continue to deliver positive alpha.
More critically, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) find evidence that
top funds deliver statistically significant out of sample performance
when funds are sorted by the information ratio, but not when the funds
are sorted by Fung and Hsieh (2004) alphas. Capocci, Corhay, and
Hubner (2005) find that only funds with prior mediocre alpha perfor-
mance continue to deliver mediocre alphas in both bull and bear
markets. In contrast, past top deliverers of alphas continue to deliver
positive alphas only during bullish market conditions. Eling (2009)
finds that performance persistence appears to be related to the meth-
odology used to detect it. Slavutskaya (2013) finds that only alpha
sorted bottom performing funds persist in producing lower returns in
the out of sample period. Meanwhile, Hentati-Kaffel and De Peretti
(2015) find that nearly 80% of all hedge fund returns are random where
evidence of performance persistence is concentrated in hedge funds that
2 We need to repeat our analysis on unsmoothed data using somewhat dif-
ferent procedures because Linton et al. (2005) adjusts for correlation no matter
what the cause including smoothing.
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follow event driven and relative value strategies. Gonzalez et al. (2016)
find that when evaluated by the Sharpe and information ratios, per-
formance persistence is more doubtful according to the doubt ratio of
Brown et al. (2010), whereas performance persistence is less doubtful
for portfolios formed on alpha and the MPPM. Finally, O'Doherty,
Savin, and Tiwari (2016) develop a pooled benchmark and demonstrate
that Fung and Hsieh (2004) alphas and other performance measures
derived from common parametric benchmark models understate per-
formance and performance persistence.
A final strand of the literature examines the structure of risk factors
that explains hedge fund returns. Titman and Tiu (2011) find an inverse
relation between the R-square of linear factor models and hedge fund
performance suggesting that better performing funds hedge systematic
risk. Sadka (2010, 2012) demonstrate that liquidity risk is positively
related to future returns suggesting that performance is related to sys-
tematic liquidity risk rather than management skill. After controlling
for share restrictions (lock up provisions and the like), Aragon (2007)
finds that alpha performance disappears. Moreover, there is a positive
association between share restrictions and underlying asset illiquidity
suggesting that share restrictions allow hedge funds to capture illi-
quidity premiums to pass on to investors.
Meanwhile, Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) find evidence of hedge
fund contagion that they attribute to liquidity shocks while Stafylas
et al. (2018) find that different risk factors are operative under different
market conditions. Chen and Liang (2007) find evidence that market
timing hedge funds can time the market for anticipated changes in
volatility, returns and their combination while Cao, Simin, and Wang
(2013) find that mutual fund managers can time the market for an-
ticipated changes in liquidity. Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) show
that a substantial proportion of the variation in hedge fund returns can
be explained by several macroeconomic risk factors.
In summary we find that we do not know much about how top
performing hedge funds add value when compared to mediocre per-
forming hedge funds. What is clear however, is that performance per-
sistence and liquidity can influence hedge fund returns. It is an un-
resolved question as to whether top as opposed to modestly performing
funds respond to these influences in the same way.
3. Data
The data we use come from a variety of sources. We use Credit
Suisse/Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services (TASS) database for the
hedge fund data. We collect the Fama-French factors from the French
Data library and the traded liquidity factor from the Lubos Pastor Data
library. Finally, equity index information is from DataStream. Most of
the literature (see Stulz, 2007) benchmark hedge fund performance
relative to the large cap S&P 500. For robustness, we include the small
cap dominated Russell 2000 and the emerging market MCSI indices to
represent alternatives hedge fund investors could accept as bench-
marks.
We select all US dollar hedge funds that have three years of his-
torical performance prior to our start date of January 31, 2001. We
need to have three years of data to avoid multi-period sampling bias
and to avoid instant history bias. Hedge fund managers often need
36 months of return data before investing in a hedge fund so including
funds with a shorter history can be misleading for these investors (see
Bali et al., 2014, online Appendix 1). Accordingly, we follow, Aggarwal
and Jorion (2010), Bali et al. (2013, 2014) and delete the first
12 months of this data to adjust for instant history bias and the re-
maining 24 data points are used to calculate the starting values of the
MPPM. We continue to collect all US dollar hedge funds with three
years of data up to December 31, 2012 as that is the last update of the
TASS data that we have. When we examine the number of observations
in the TASS database, we note the exponential growth of the data that
seems to have moderated from January 1998 onwards as from that
date, the total number of fund month observations, including dead
observations, grew from 20,000, peaking at 50,000 in 2007 and falling
to approximately 29,000 in 2012.3 By commencing our study from
January 1998 we avoid a possible growth trend in the data.
We collect all monthly holding period returns net of fees. We adjust
for survivorship bias by including all funds both live and dead. We
calculate the manipulation proof performance measure of Goetzmann
et al. (2007) as reported below where t = 1, …, T and A is the risk
aversion parameter, rt is the net monthly holding period return of the
hedge fund, rft is the one-month t-bill return, and ∆t is one month.
+ +=MPPM A A t ln T r r( ) 1(1 ) 1 [(1 )/(1 )]tT t ft A1 (1 ) (1)
The measure MPPM(A) represents the certainty equivalent excess
(over the risk-free rate) monthly return for an investor with a risk
aversion of A employing a utility function similar to the power utility
function. This implies that the MPPM is relevant for risk adverse in-
vestors who have constant relative risk aversion. The MPPM does not
rely on any distributional assumptions. Billio et al. (2013) find that the
MPPM measure is influenced by the mean of returns and does not fully
consider other moments of the distribution of returns such as skewness
and kurtosis. This effect is most likely felt for MPPM when the risk
aversion coefficient is low. Therefore, for robustness, we compute the
MPPM over a wide variety of risk aversion parameters of 2, 3 and 8.
Another empirical issue is data smoothing where hedge fund man-
agers do not always report gains or losses promptly leading to serial
dependence in the return data. If left unadjusted, the test statistic could
be inflated. We use Linton et al. (2005) that obtains consistent estimates
of the critical values even when the data suffers from such serial de-
pendence. For robustness we later repeat our empirical work on un-
smoothed data to find the same results we report below using Linton
et al. (2005) on the TASS reported data.
Table 1 reports that our data consists of 4600 funds with 176,483
fund month observations. This sample is smaller than Bali et al. (2013)
who include non US dollar denominated funds but is comparable in size
to Ammann et al. (2013) and Hentati-Kaffel and De Peretti (2015). A
striking fact is the huge attrition rate of hedge funds, less than one half
of all the hedge funds included in our data are live at the end of our
sample period. Live funds are larger, have a longer history and have
better performance than dead funds. Moreover, net hedge fund returns
are modest, only 37 basis points per month (approximately 4.5% an-
nually) on average throughout the sample period. This is consistent
with the continuing decline in hedge fund net returns reported by
Dichev and Yu (2011).
We also examine the time series characteristics of our data in
Table 2. Clearly, the hedge fund industry is accident prone, with overall
negative excess rates of return in 2002, 2008 and 2011. For each of
these disappointing years, the number of funds in our sample decreases
either during the year (2002) or in the year following (2008, 2011). The
manipulation proof performance measure gives an even more critical
assessment of the performance of hedge funds, revealing that for in-
vestors with a risk aversion parameter of 2 (8), hedge funds were un-
able to return a certainty equivalent premium above the risk-free rate
for five (eight) of the twelve years in our sample. Overtime, the average
size and age of hedge funds is increasing although there is a noticeable
decrease in the average size post 2008.
We seek information concerning the generic strategies followed by
“top” and “mediocre” funds and are less interested in examining stra-
tegies by style partly because this issue has been well examined by
Stafylas et al. (2018). We chose to aggregate our data by fund of funds,
the largest grouping of hedge funds with 1273 funds and 45,700 fund
month observations and by all hedge funds. Fung et al. (2008) suggest
3 In contrast, the number of fund month observations nearly tripled in the
previous five years. The details of the annual fund month observations are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
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that fund of fund hedge fund data is more reliable than other ag-
gregations of hedge fund data as fund of fund data is less prone to re-
porting biases and so are more reflective of the actual losses and in-
vestment constraints faced by investors in hedge funds.
We form equally weighted portfolios of all fund of fund and all
hedge funds monthly from January 31, 2001 until December 31, 2012
from the above data. The distribution of monthly average returns and
MPPM performance measures for a wide range of risk aversion para-
meters from 2 to 8 for the fund of fund, all hedge funds and for the S&P
500, Russell 2000 and MSCI emerging market indices are reported in
Table 3. All performance measures for all assets have significant de-
partures from normality so it is imperative that we conduct our em-
pirical investigation using techniques that are robust to the empirical
return distribution. For each month, we separate the sample by quintile
and then hold these portfolios for the subsequent 24 months calculating
the MPPM measures for each out of sample month. Therefore, we
construct 2880 portfolios each for the top and mediocre performing
funds to examine the behaviour of hedge funds by performance level as
we enter and move through the 2007–08 financial crisis.
4. Stochastic dominance tests for hedge funds performance
In this section, we develop two procedures for comparing distribu-
tions of hedge funds returns. First, we are interested in testing whether
hedge funds outperform or underperform the market and second,
whether top performing funds outperform mediocre funds out of
sample and for how long. Our procedures for testing differences be-
tween distribution functions rely on the concept of first and second
order stochastic dominance. Stochastic dominance analysis provides a
utility-based framework for evaluating investors' prospects under un-
certainty, thereby facilitating the decision-making process. With respect
to the traditional mean-variance analysis, stochastic dominance re-
quires less restrictive assumptions about investor preferences.
Specifically, stochastic dominance does not require a full parametric
specification of investor preferences but relies only on the non-satiation
assumption in the case of first order stochastic dominance and risk
Table 1
Sample of hedge funds.
This table reports the basic sample statistics and the performance of hedge funds from January 31, 2001 until December 31, 2012.MPPM (A)a are the manipulation
proof performance measures of Goetzmann et al. (2007) with a risk aversion parameter of A = 2, 3 and 8 respectively. Number is the number of hedge funds, Assets
are in millions, age is in years and the risk-free rate Rf, the rate of return RoR net of fees and the three manipulation proof performance measures are in percent.
Strategy Number Assets Age Rf RoR MPPM(2) MPPM(3) MPPM(8)
Convertible arbitrage 124 $251.47 6.44 0.18 0.32 0.00 −0.02 −0.08
Dedicated short bias 24 $25.73 6.05 0.17 −0.08 −0.06 −0.07 −0.16
Emerging markets 417 $196.34 5.94 0.10 0.59 0.01 −0.01 −0.14
Equity market neutral 182 $170.66 5.79 0.15 0.36 −0.02 −0.04 −0.06
Event driven 347 $375.06 6.67 0.15 0.48 0.03 0.02 −0.01
Fixed income arbitrage 114 $302.15 6.29 0.17 0.37 0.02 0.01 −0.05
Fund of funds 1273 $206.00 5.97 0.12 0.12 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
Global macro 158 $550.54 5.89 0.13 0.42 0.03 0.02 −0.02
Long/short equity hedge 1265 $155.44 6.27 0.14 0.44 0.01 0.00 −0.07
Managed futures 295 $257.77 6.43 0.12 0.56 0.01 −0.01 −0.11
Multi-strategy 266 $437.17 5.86 0.12 0.43 0.02 0.01 −0.03
Options strategy 12 $92.53 7.70 0.13 0.55 0.03 0.02 0.00
Other 123 $273.05 5.74 0.11 0.60 0.03 0.02 −0.05
Grand total 4600 $238.48 6.14 0.13 0.37 0.01 0.00 −0.06
Live funds 1922 $256.67 6.27 0.08 0.45 0.02 0.01 −0.06
Dead funds 2678 $221.24 5.62 0.18 0.30 0.00 −0.01 −0.08
First half 2033 $223.80 5.17 0.23 0.74 0.04 0.03 −0.01
Second half 2567 $246.31 6.32 0.08 0.19 −0.01 −0.02 −0.08
a + +=( )MPPM A ln r r( ) [(1 )/(1 )]A t T tT t ft A1(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) where A = the risk aversion parameter, t is time Δt is one month, rt is the unannualized monthly return
net of fees and Rft is the monthly unannualized risk free rate.
Table 2
Time series characteristics of the sample of hedge funds.
This table reports the time series statistics of the performance of hedge funds from January 31, 2001 until December 31, 2012. MPPM (A)a are the manipulation
proof performance measures of Goetzmann et al. (2007) with a risk aversion parameter of A = 2, 3 and 8 respectively. Number is the number of hedge funds, Assets
are in millions, age is in years and the risk-free rate Rf, the rate of return RoR net of fees and the three manipulation proof performance measures are in percent.
Year Number Assets Age Rf RoR MPPM(2) MPPM(3) MPPM(8)
2001 512 $147.72 4.42 0.31 0.25 −0.08 −0.10 −0.20
2002 151 $156.68 4.80 0.13 −0.11 −0.02 −0.03 −0.09
2003 246 $171.35 5.32 0.08 1.39 0.05 0.04 −0.01
2004 455 $223.09 5.09 0.10 0.80 0.08 0.07 0.04
2005 333 $253.57 5.15 0.25 0.71 0.04 0.03 0.00
2006 336 $271.30 5.57 0.39 0.93 0.06 0.06 0.03
2007 397 $314.81 5.86 0.38 0.85 0.05 0.05 0.02
2008 428 $309.20 5.99 0.14 −1.70 −0.10 −0.12 −0.20
2009 282 $225.02 6.41 0.01 1.45 −0.09 −0.12 −0.26
2010 483 $225.39 6.68 0.01 0.87 0.10 0.09 0.04
2011 567 $207.16 6.30 0.00 −0.55 0.03 0.02 −0.03
2012 410 $207.62 6.62 0.00 0.46 −0.03 −0.04 −0.11
Total 4600 $238.48 5.93 0.13 0.37 0.01 0.00 −0.06
a + +=( )MPPM A ln r r( ) [(1 )/(1 )]A t T tT t ft A1(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) where A = the risk aversion parameter, t is time Δt is one month, rt is the unannualized monthly return
net of fees and Rft is the monthly unannualized risk free rate.
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aversion in the case of second order stochastic dominance. If there is
stochastic dominance, then the expected utility of an investor is always
higher under the dominant asset and therefore no rational investor
would choose the dominated asset.
Let U₁ denote the class of all von Neumann-Morgestern type of
utility functions, u, such that u ′ ≥ 0, also let U₂ denote the class of all
utility functions in U₁ for which u ′ ′ ≤ 0, and U₃ denote a subset of Uj
for which u ′ ′ ′ ≤ 0. Let X₁ and X2 denote two random variables and let
F ₁ (x) and F ₂ (x) be the cumulative distribution functions of X1 and X2
respectively, then we define.
Definition 1. X₁first order stochastically dominates X2 if and only if
either:
i) E[u(X1)] ≥ E[u(X2)] for all u ∈ U₁
ii) F ₁ (x) ≤ F ₂ (x) for every x with strict inequality for some x.
According to Definition 1 investors prefer hedge funds with higher
returns to lower returns, which imply that a utility function has a non-
negative first derivative. First order stochastic dominance is a very
strong result, for it implies that all non-satiated investors will prefer X1
to X2, regardless of whether they are risk neutral, risk-averse or risk
loving. Second order stochastically dominance also takes risk aversion
into account, but it posits a negative second derivative (which implies
diminishing marginal utility) of the investor's utility function. This is
sufficient for risk aversion. More formally, the definition of second
order stochastic dominance4 is as follows:
Definition 2. The prospect X1 second order stochastic dominates X2 if
and only if either:
i) E[u(X1)] ≥ E[u(X2)]
ii) ∫ −∞xF1(t)dt ≤ ∫−∞yF2(t)dt for every x with strict inequality for
some x.
Testing for stochastic dominance is based on comparing (functions
of) the cumulate distributions of the hedge funds and stock market
indexes. The true cumulated distribution functions are not known in
practice. Therefore, stochastic dominance tests rely on the empirical
distribution functions. In the literature several procedures have been
proposed to test for stochastic dominance. An early work by McFadden
(1989) proposed a generalization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of
first and second order stochastic dominance among several prospects
(distributions) based on i.i.d. observations and independent prospects.
Later works by Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden (1991) and Barrett
and Donald (2003) extended these tests allowing for dependence in
observations and replacing independence with a general exchange-
ability among the competing prospects. We chose to use Linton et al.
Table 3
Monthly average characteristics of the performance measures.
This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the minimum and maximum of the average monthly performance measures for
the fund of fund X1 and all hedge funds X2 and the S&P 500 (S&P), Russell 2000 (RUSS) and MSCI (EMI) emerging market indices from January 31, 2001 until
December 31, 2012. We also report the cut offs for the 20th, 40th, and 60th percentiles for all performance statistics. Jarque-Bera, JB = n[(S22)/6) + {(K — 3)2}/
24] is a formal statistic for testing whether the returns are normally distributed, where n denotes the number of observations, S is skewness and K is kurtosis. This test
statistic is asymptotically Chi-squared distributed with 2 degrees of freedom. The statistic rejects normality at the 1% level with a critical value of 9.2. MPPM(2),
MPPM(3) and MPPM(8) are the manipulation proof performance measures MPPMa of Goetzmann et al. (2007) with a risk aversion parameter of 2, 3 and 8
respectively. All data is in percent.
Statistic Rate of return MPPM(2)
X1 X2 S&P Russ EMI X1 X2 S&P Russ MSCI
Mean 0.25 0.44 0.32 0.68 1.28 −0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01 0.05
Median 0.57 0.66 1.00 1.63 1.28 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.14
St. Dev. 1.55 1.79 4.59 5.97 7.04 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.22 0.32
Skewness −1.29 −0.84 −0.59 −0.51 −0.66 −1.40 −1.36 −1.22 −0.42 −0.96
Excess kurt 3.52 1.72 0.93 0.75 1.32 1.88 3.15 1.36 0.16 0.89
Min −6.53 −6.47 −16.80 −20.80 −27.35 −0.27 −0.43 −0.29 −0.61 −0.92
20th percentile −0.79 −1.03 −2.51 −4.28 −3.32 −0.05 −0.05 −0.07 −0.16 −0.19
40th percentile 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.05 −0.05 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.03 0.07
60th percentile 0.78 1.14 1.51 2.82 3.84 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.18
80th percentile 1.48 1.78 3.72 5.32 7.14 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.28
Max 3.33 4.89 10.93 15.46 17.14 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.48 0.62
JB 41.56 27.00 34.15 36.61 27.44 54.26 44.78 51.82 52.48 48.73
Statistic MPPM(3) MPPM(8)
X1 X2 S&P Russ EMI X1 X2 S&P Russ EMI
Mean 0.01 0.05 −0.01 −0.03 0.02 −0.06 −0.06 −0.09 −0.12 −0.13
Median 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.12 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.05 0.03
St. Dev. 0.22 0.32 0.23 0.21 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.29 0.44
Skewness −0.42 −0.96 −0.50 −0.79 −1.01 −1.64 −1.64 −0.93 −0.88 −1.32
Excess kurt 0.16 0.89 0.24 0.13 0.94 3.02 3.02 0.24 0.71 1.53
Min −0.61 −0.92 −0.66 −0.63 −0.99 −0.66 −0.66 −0.77 −0.93 −1.41
20th percentile −0.16 −0.19 −0.19 −0.23 −0.21 −0.14 −0.14 −0.31 −0.29 −0.39
40th percentile −0.03 0.07 −0.05 0.02 0.02 −0.06 −0.06 −0.05 −0.17 −0.12
60th percentile 0.08 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.08
80th percentile 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.20
Max 0.48 0.62 0.47 0.41 0.60 0.12 0.12 0.37 0.44 0.56
JB 52.48 48.73 51.90 64.31 50.02 64.36 64.36 66.48 50.11 54.75
a + +=( )MPPM A ln r r( ) [(1 )/(1 )]A t T tT t ft A1(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) where A = the risk aversion parameter, t is time Δt is one month, rt is the unannualized monthly return
net of fees and Rft is the monthly unannualized risk free rate.
4 See Levy (1992) for more details on the definition of first and second order
stochastic dominance.
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(2005) as it represents an important breakthrough in this literature
where consistent critical values for testing stochastic dominance are
obtained for serially dependent observations. The procedure also ac-
commodates for general dependence among the prospects which are to
be ranked. Below, we first briefly define the criteria of stochastic
dominance and we then describe the testing procedure for stochastic
dominance adopted in the paper.
4.1. Testing procedure for stochastic dominance
The test of first order and second order stochastic dominance are
based on empirical evaluations of the conditions in above definitions.
Let s = 1, 2 represents the order of stochastic dominance. Let Φ ∈ {the
joint support of Xi and Xj, for i ≠ j}. Let Dis(x) and Djs(y) the empirical
distribution of Xi and Xj, respectively. To test the null hypothesis, H0 : Xi
≳sXj (where “≳s” indicates stochastic dominance at the s order), we test
that
H : D (x; F ) D (x; F),0 is i js j
∀x ∈ ℝ, s = 1, 2. The alternative hypothesis is the negation of the null,
that is >H : D (x; F ) D (x; F),1 is i js j
∀x ∈ ℝ, s = 1, 2. To construct the inference procedure, we consider the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between functionals of the empirical
distribution functions of Xi and Xj and define the test statistic as= min sup N [D (x; F ) D (x; F)],x is i js j (2)
where t = 1, …, N and
= =D (x; F ) 1N(s 1)! 1(X x)(x X ) ,is i t 1T i,t i.t s 1 (3)
and D (x; F)js j is similarly defined. Linton et al. (2005) show that under
suitable regularity conditions converges to a functional of a Gaussian
process. However, the asymptotic null distribution of depends on the
unknown population distributions, therefore in order to estimate the
asymptotic p-values of the test we use the overlapping moving block
bootstrap method. The bootstrap procedure involves calculating the test
statistics using the original sample and then generating the sub-
samples by sampling the overlapping data blocks. Once that the boot-
strap subsample is obtained, one can calculate the bootstrap analogue
of . In particular, let B be the number of bootstrap replications and b
the size of the block. The bootstrap procedure involves calculating the
test statistics in Eq. (2) using the original sample and then generating
the subsamples by sampling the N − b + 1 overlapping data blocks.
Once that the bootstrap subsample is obtained one can calculate the
bootstrap analogue of . Defining the bootstrap analogue of Eq. (2) as= min sup N [D (x; F ) D (x; F)]x is i js j (4)
where
= =
D (x, F )
1
N(s 1)!
{1(X x)(x X ) (i, b, N)
1(X x)(x X ) }
k
i 1
N
2i 2i
s 1
2i 2i
s 1
and
= ++ +(i, b, N)
i/b if [1, b 1]
1 if i [1, N b 1]
(N i 1)/b if [N b 2, N]
The estimated bootstrap p-value function is defined as the quantity
= + =
+
p ( ) 1
N b 1
1( ).
i 1
N b 1
Under the assumption that the stochastic processes Xi and Xj are
strictly stationary and α-mixing with α(j) = O(j−δ), for some δ > 1,
when B → ∞ the expression in Eq. (4) converges to Eq. (2). Also,
asymptotic theory requires that b → ∞ and b/N → 0 as N → ∞.
4.2. Testing for hedge fund performance
Classifications of “top performance” within an asset class (i.e. hedge
funds) is relative so we need some check to make sure that “top per-
forming” hedge funds have in fact superior performance in an absolute
sense. One way of doing this is to compare the performance of hedge
funds against alternative classes of assets. We chose as our benchmarks
“the market” as represented by the large cap S&P 500, the smaller cap
Russell 2000 and an internationally diversified portfolio as represented
by the MCSI index. The idea is that if hedge funds, as an asset class,
perform as well or better than these assets, then we have assurance the
very best performing hedge funds have indeed superior performance.
Accordingly, our first stochastic dominance test is to determine if
the returns of portfolios of all fund of fund and all hedge funds out-
perform or underperform the market using the MPPM of Goetzmann
et al. (2007). We chose the MPPM as Brown et al. (2010) suggests is the
most accurate performance measure. Bali et al. (2013) finds that a
broad range of traditional mean variance performance measures (e.g.
Sharpe and Traynor ratios) and downside adjusted risk measures (e.g.
VAR and Sortino ratios) are not robust as they provide inconsistent
rankings of performance whereas the MPPM does not have this issue.
We calculate the MPPM using a broad range of risk aversion parameters
(A = 2, 3, 8) in response to Billio et al. (2013).
For each hedge portfolio, we test to determine if the returns first or
second order stochastically dominate, or the reverse, three market in-
dexes. The essence of our test strategy is as follows. Let Xi be the per-
formance of the hedge fund portfolio i (for i = 1, 2; fund of funds, all
hedge funds) and let Yj denote the performance of the stock market
index j (for j = 1, …, 3; S & P500, Russell 2000, MSCI). Let s be the
order of stochastic dominance. To establish the direction of stochastic
dominance between Xi and Yj, we test the following hypotheses
H X Y: ,i s j01
and
H Y X: ,j s i02
with the alternative being the negation of the null hypothesis for both
H01 and H0.2 We infer that returns of the hedge fund portfolio sto-
chastically dominate the returns from the market if we accept H01 and
reject H02. Conversely, we infer that the market returns stochastically
dominate the hedge fund portfolio returns if we accept H02 and reject
H01. In cases where neither of the null hypotheses can be rejected, we
infer that the stochastic dominance test is inconclusive.
Panels A, B and C in Table 4 report the results of this stochastic
dominance test for the S&P 500, Russel 2000 and MSCI indexes re-
spectively. For each panel, empirical p-values test whether the fund of
fund aggregation of hedge funds first and second order dominate the
candidate benchmark (column three) or the reverse (column four).
Under the null hypothesis if H01 : X1≻sYj the fund of fund portfolio
stochastically dominates the j market index at s order, whereas under
H02 : Yj≻sX1 the opposite is true. Similarly, columns five and six report
the p-values that tests whether the aggregation of all hedge funds X2
first or second order dominate the candidate stock market index or the
reverse.
In Table 4, rejection of the null hypothesis is based on small p-values
of the test statistic. Table 4 reports that hedge funds do not first order
stochastic dominate all stock market benchmarks no matter which
performance measure is taken into consideration. This result is not
surprising as first order stochastic dominance implies that all non-sa-
tiated investors will prefer hedge fund portfolio Xi regardless of risk.
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Panels A and C in Table 4 shows, neither the null hypothesis
H01 : Xi≻s≔2Yj nor H02 : Yj≻s≔2Xi can be rejected for the S&P 500 and
MSCI stock market benchmarks. Therefore, the stochastic dominance
test is inconclusive. However, the test results are different in Panel B for
the Russel 2000 benchmark. Here we see that the hypothesis
H01 : Xi≻s≔2Yj cannot be rejected so evidently hedge funds out-
performed the small cap dominated Russel 2000 index. In any event, we
conclude that despite the declining returns suffered by the hedge fund
industry in recent years, the hedge fund industry at least did not un-
derperform the market. This conclusion is consistent with Bali et al.
(2013), who find that the fund of fund hedge fund strategy does not
outperform the S&P500 according to the MPPM.
4.3. Performance persistence of top performing hedge funds
We now consider our second stochastic dominance test, namely
whether top performing hedge funds outperform mediocre funds out of
sample. Our testing strategy is to construct top (fifth) quintile portfolios
formed on the MPPM(2), MPPM(3) and MPPM(8) performance mea-
sures and compare the performance of these portfolios to the perfor-
mance of similarly formed mediocre (third) quintile portfolios. These
quintile portfolios, once formed, are held for twenty-four months. We
avoid comparing top to bottom quintile portfolios because hedge funds
in the bottom performing quintile are subject to a second round of
survivorship bias as poorly performing funds continue to leave the TASS
database during the twenty-four months out of sample period.5
Specifically, we form 120 monthly portfolios from January 31, 2001
to December 31, 2010. For each month, we form portfolios of hedge
funds by quintile according to that month's manipulation proof
performance measure of Goetzmann et al. (2007). We then hold these
portfolios for twenty-four months and then measure the performance of
these portfolios by quintile and by performance measure at six, twelve,
eighteen and twenty-four months out of sample. The portfolios are
equally weighted. Individual funds that were included in the formation
portfolio that later disappeared during the out of sample twenty-four
month valuation period are assumed reinvested in the remaining funds.
Therefore, we measure persistence of performance by comparing the
out of sample performance of portfolios formed on the top and med-
iocre portfolio according to a given performance measure for up to
twenty-four months after the quintile portfolios were formed.
The testing strategy is as follows. Let δ = t + ε be the time incre-
ment. For each fund portfolio Xi, let Zk be the k-th quintile of Θ, where
Θ = {Zk : zk|δ, Zk ⊆ Xi, k ∈ {1,…,5}}. We consider the subset
with k ∈ {3,5} which we refer to as mediocre and top quantile, re-
spectively, and we test the following hypotheses
H Z Z: ,s01 5 3
and
H Z Z: .s02 3 5
As before, the alternatives are the negation of the null hypotheses.
We infer that returns of the top quintile hedge fund portfolio Z5 sto-
chastically dominates the returns from the mediocre hedge fund port-
folio Z3 if we accept H01 and reject H02. Conversely, we infer that the
returns of the mediocre portfolio Z3 stochastically dominate the top
fifth quintile portfolio returns Z5 if we accept H02 and reject H01. In
cases where neither of the null hypotheses can be rejected, we infer that
the stochastic dominance test is inconclusive.
Table 5 reports the results of our performance persistence tests.
Table 5 is organized into three panels, each panel reporting whether the
portfolio formed from top funds stochastically dominate the portfolio
formed from mediocre funds six, twelve, eighteen and twenty-four
months out of sample according to the MMPM(2), MPPM(3) and MPPM
(8) respectively. For each panel, reading along the columns, columns
three and four reports the p-values of the first and second order sto-
chastic dominance test for top versus mediocre funds and the reverse
for the fund of funds strategy and the last two columns reports the same
for the all hedge funds in our sample.
Table 5 reports that the dominance tests are consistent for the
portfolio of all hedge funds and for the fund of fund hedge funds.
Specifically, top quintile funds first and second order dominate med-
iocre funds up to six months out of sample. This discovery of shorter-
term persistence is consistent with Agarwal and Naik (2000). Therefore,
unlike Slavutskaya (2013), we do find some evidence of performance
persistence for top funds but performance persistence is much more
modest than found by Gonzalez et al. (2016), Ammann et al. (2013) and
Boyson (2008). In any event we conclude that top performing funds
persistently outperform mediocre funds for at least six months.
5. Risk profile of hedge funds
Table 5 shows that top quintile performing hedge funds continue to
outperform the corresponding mediocre hedge funds for at least six
months out of sample. This suggests that top performing funds are
different in some way that enables them to achieve distinctly superior
performance. To discover how these top performing funds are different
from mediocre funds, we examine the risk profiles of top and mediocre
funds six months after they were formed.
The asset pricing literature is dominated by the APT and extended
CAPM approaches where no one approach dominates. For hedge funds,
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seminal paper identifies a seven-factor sys-
tematic risk factor model. CAPM has been extended several times to
accommodate various anomalies. Fama and French (1995) add a size
and a value factor to CAPM while Carhart (1997) adds momentum and
Table 4
Comparing hedge fund performance with the stock market.
This table reports the p-values for first and second order stochastic dominance
tests (s = 1 or 2 respectively) to determine if the fund of fund (X1) and overall
universe of US dollar hedge funds (X2) outperform the market according to the
Manipulation Proof Performance Measure MPPMa using a risk aversion para-
meter of 2, MPPM(2) 3, MPPM(3) and 8 MPPM(8). Panels A, B and C compare
hedge funds to the S&P 500, Russell 2000 and theMSCI emerging market indices
respectively. We reject the null for small p-values.
s H01 : X1≻sYj H02 : Yj≻sX1 H01 : X2≻sYj H02 : Yj≻sX2
Panel A S&P 500
MPPM(2) 1 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000
2 0.988 0.699 0.799 0.999
MPPM(3) 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.502 0.463 0.999 0.991
MPPM(8) 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.537 0.234 0.678 0.504
Panel B 0Russell 2000
MPPM(2) 1 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001
2 0.763 0.003 0.581 0.007
MPPM(3) 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027
2 0.774 0.008 0.568 0.005
MPPM(8) 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.995 0.003 0.538 0.001
Panel C MSCI
MPPM(2) 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.999 0.669 0.644 0.998
MPPM(3) 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MPPM(8) 2 0.582 0.483 0.562 0.477
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.557 0.519 0.992 0.504
a + +=( )MPPM A ln r r( ) [(1 )/(1 )]A t T tT t ft A1(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) where A = the
risk aversion parameter, t is time Δt is one month, rt is the unannualized
monthly return net of fees and Rft is the monthly unannualized risk free rate.
5 See Gonzalez et al. (2016) for a detailed explanation.
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Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) adds liquidity to Fama and French
(1995). More recently, Fama and French (2015) add two additional
factors for profitability and investment factors to the Fama and French
(1995) three factor model.
Our literature review reveals that liquidity (see Aragon, 2007;
Boyson et al., 2010; Sadka, 2010, 2012) and persistence influence
hedge fund returns. Persistence could be a result of momentum, so we
think it is interesting to see if the reliance of hedge funds on momentum
and liquidity is the same by performance level. Therefore, we use
Carhart's (1997) momentum augmented Fama and French (1995)
model and include momentum reversal and Pastor and Stambaugh's
(2003) traded liquidity factor as prior research suggests that liquidity
and momentum are likely to be other market priced risk factors.6 To
account for the option like payoffs that are prevalent for hedge funds
(see Fung & Hsieh, 2001, 2004; Page & Panariello, 2018) we include the
first principal component of the five categories of lookback straddle
returns of Fung and Hsieh (2001). Therefore, we explain out of sample
net excess returns of top and mediocre performing hedge funds by
quintile for the fund of fund sector using a parsimonious extension of
Carhart (1997).7 Accordingly, the procedure is to regress excess hedge
fund returns by quintile at six months out of sample on risk factors for
the excess market return (MKTRFt), size (SMBt), value (HMLt), mo-
mentum (MOMt), momentum reversal (LTRt), liquidity (TRADELIQt)
and volatility (LOOKBACKt).
In detail, let ¨ be the subset ¨ with= Z z Z X k¨ { : | , , {3, 5}}t k k t k, , 1 . We define=F Z RF ,t k t k t, ,
where Zt, k are the monthly rate of returns of the portfolio X1 for six
months after the portfolio was formed and RFt is the one-month risk free
rate of return from the French Data Library. Then, the model specified is
as follows:=F f MKTRF SMB HML MOM LTR TRADELIQ LOOKBACK( , , , , , , ).t k t t t t t t t,
(5)
We estimate Eq. (5) using the quantile regression method. Quantile
regression is a procedure for estimating a functional relationship be-
tween the response variable and the explanatory variables for all
Table 5
Comparing top and mediocre hedge fund performance.
This table reports p-values for the first and second order stochastic dominance
tests (s = 1 or 2 respectively) to determine if the top (fifth) quintile Z5 fund of
fund X1 and overall universe of US dollar hedge funds X2 outperform the
mediocre (third) quintile Z3 for t months out of sample according to the ma-
nipulation proof performance measure MPPMa using a risk aversion parameter
of 2, MPPM(2), 3, MPPM(3) and 8, MPPM(8). We reject the null for small p-
values.
t s X1 X2
H01 : Z5≻sZ3 H01 : Z3≻sZ5 H01 : Z5≻sZ3 H01 : Z3≻sZ5
Panel A MPPM(2)
6 1 0.999 0.041 0.993 0.000
2 0.992 0.000 0.999 0.000
12 1 0.775 0.531 0.494 0.978
2 0.999 0.331 0.956 0.720
18 1 0.420 0.999 0.188 0.999
2 0.503 0.970 0.426 0.988
24 1 0.427 0.999 0.210 0.999
2 0.560 0.514 0.595 0.892
Panel C MPPM(3)
6 1 0.987 0.035 0.991 0.000
2 0.999 0.000 0.999 0.000
12 1 0.223 0.999 0.716 0.723
2 0.145 0.813 0.995 0.509
18 1 0.423 0.999 0.157 0.999
2 0.634 0.847 0.408 0.989
24 1 0.995 0.999 0.384 0.999
2 0.404 0.780 0.614 0.534
Panel D MPPM(8)
6 1 0.497 0.001 0.843 0.016
2 0.997 0.000 0.999 0.000
12 1 0.178 0.999 0.627 0.392
2 0.234 0.709 0.998 0.974
18 1 0.692 0.581 0.499 0.430
2 0.515 0.326 0.864 0.635
24 1 0.995 0.999 0.384 0.999
2 0.404 0.780 0.614 0.534
a + +=( )MPPM A ln r r( ) [(1 )/(1 )]A t T tT t ft A1(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) where A = the
risk aversion parameter, t is time Δt is one month, rt is the unannualized
monthly return net of fees and Rft is the monthly unannualized risk free rate.
Table 6
Top and mediocre hedge fund risk profiles.
This table reports the quantile response, at the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles,
of the returns for top performing Z5 and mediocre performing funds Z3 (ac-
cording to the manipulation proof performance measure with a risk parameter
of 3) of the fund of fund portfolios six months out of sample in response to a
unit change in the risk factors for market risk (MKTRF), size (SMB), value
(HML), momentum (MOM), long term momentum reversal (LTR), liquidity
(TRADELIQ) and lookback straddles returns (LOOKBACK).
Quantile Ft, 5 Ft, 3
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Q25 CONS −0.589⁎⁎ 0.314 −0.606⁎⁎⁎ 0.129
MKTRFt 0.374⁎⁎⁎ 0.080 0.256⁎⁎⁎ 0.032
SMBt 0.140 0.131 0.065⁎⁎⁎ 0.021
HMLt 0.020 0.136 0.174⁎⁎⁎ 0.055
MOMt 0.208⁎⁎⁎ 0.062 0.087⁎⁎⁎ 0.025
LTRt −0.128 0.152 −0.209⁎⁎⁎ 0.062
TRADELIQt −1.810 1.756 4.062⁎⁎⁎ 1.244
LOOKBACKt 0.406 0.314 −0.147 0.126
R2 0.225 0.390
Q50 CONS −0.949⁎⁎⁎ 0.304 0.266⁎⁎ 0.134
MKTRFt 0.239⁎⁎⁎ 0.077 0.185⁎⁎⁎ 0.034
SMBt −0.215 0.127 0.105⁎⁎ 0.036
HMLt 0.010 0.132 0.012⁎⁎ 0.005
MOMt 0.109⁎ 0.061 0.064⁎⁎ 0.026
LTRt −0.059 0.148 −0.081 0.065
TRADELIQt −1.584 1.720 2.413⁎⁎⁎ 0.388
LOOKBACKt 0.308 0.300 −0.027 0.132
R2 0.147 0.280
Q75 CONS 2.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.180 0.863⁎⁎⁎ 0.107
MKTRFt 0.269⁎⁎⁎ 0.046 0.197⁎⁎⁎ 0.027
SMBt −0.004 0.075 0.089⁎⁎ 0.045
HMLt −0.033 0.078 0.044⁎⁎ 0.026
MOMt 0.088⁎⁎ 0.036 0.049⁎⁎ 0.021
LTRt 0.007 0.087 −0.006 0.052
TRADELIQt 4.640⁎⁎ 1.576 2.432⁎⁎ 0.729
LOOKBACKt 0.619⁎⁎⁎ 0.178 0.123 0.106
R2 0.206 0.270
⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎ statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. SE are the
estimated standard errors.
6 It has been suggested that we look at Fung and Hsieh (2004) too. The results
are problematic however as our portfolios, being selected according to perfor-
mance level rather than by random selection, may not be well diversified.
Moreover, Fung and Hsieh (2004) type models are most informative when
analysing the behaviour of hedge funds by style rather than by performance
level. An analysis of hedge fund by style is provided by Stafylas et al. (2018).
7 For the sake of robustness, we also estimate the model using the data for all
hedge funds and obtain similar results. We also estimate a less parsimonious
model by including the profitability and investment factors of Fama and French
(2015) and find that these additional factors are not significant. This may be
due to the correlation between factors and/or to their time-varying dimensions.
Racicot and Theoret (2013) find that the hedge fund exposure to these factors
may change substantially over the business cycle.
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portions of the probability distribution. The previous literature focused
on estimating the effects of the above risk factors on the conditional
mean of the excess returns. However, the focus on the conditional mean
of returns may hide important features of the hedge fund risk profile.
While the traditional linear regression model can address whether a
given risk factor in Eq. (5) affects the hedge fund conditional returns, it
can't answer another important question: Does a one unit increase of a
given risk factor of Eq. (5) affect returns the same way for all points in
the return distribution? Therefore, the conditional mean function well
represents the center of the distribution, but little information is known
about the rest of the distribution. In this respect, the quantile regression
estimates provide information regarding the impact of risk factors at all
parts of the returns' distribution.
Eq. (5) can be specified as
= =Q R R( r) ( ), for 0 1t t (6)
where Q(∙) = inf {fk : G(Ft, k) ≥ τ} and G(Ft, k) is the cumulate density
function of Ft, k. The vector Rt is the set of risk factors in Eq. (5) and β is
a vector of coefficients to be estimated. In Eq. (6) the τ-quantile is ex-
pressed as the solution of the optimization problem
= =argmin F R( ) ( )i
n
t k t
1
, (7)
where ρτ(ξ) = ξ(τ − I(ξ < 0)) and I(∙) is an indicator function. Eq. (7)
is then solved by linear programming methods and the partial deriva-
tive:
= =Q R r
r
( | )t
can be interpreted as the marginal change relative to the τ-quantile of Q
(∙) due to a unit increase in a given element of the vector Rt. As τ in-
creases continuously from 0 to 1, it is possible to trace the entire dis-
tribution of Ft, k conditional on Rt.
The estimation method used to find the solution of the minimization
problem in Eq. (7) is the GMM-based robust instrumental variables
technique (see Le Yu & Sokbae, 2018). As highlighted by Racicot and
Rentz (2015) (see also Racicot & Rentz, 2016 and the references
therein) it is important to account for the presence of measurement
errors and endogeneity that may lead to an inconsistent estimation
when the ordinary least squares method is applied to a Fama and
French-type model. Recent research has highlighted that liquidity, for
example, may endogenously reveal itself during a period of financial
turmoil (see Adrian, Fleming, Shachar, & Vogt, 2017). In this respect
using instrumental quantile regression methods address the en-
dogeneity issue delivering consistent estimators in Eq. (7).
Table 6 reports the quantile regression estimates of Eq. (6) for the
top Ft, 5 and mediocre Ft, 3 performing portfolio excess returns six
months out of sample. This table has three panels reporting the esti-
mates of Eq. (6) at the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles. In column three,
the estimated coefficients for Eq. (6) for the top quintile of performing
funds Ft, 5 are reported, whereas column five reports the estimates for
the mediocre performing funds Ft, 3. In columns four and six, the cor-
responding bootstrapped robust standard errors for the estimated
coefficients are reported. The standard errors were calculated by re-
sampling the estimated residuals of Eq. (6) using the non-parametric
bootstrap method with 1000 replications.
Table 6 reports that top performing hedge funds have a distinctly
different risk profile than mediocre funds. Only two factors are
Fig. 1. Marginal effects of risk factors on excess returns for top performing funds.
Each graph in the above figure depicts the relation between the size and the significance of the coefficient and the quantile of a given risk factor for top performing
funds as measured by the manipulation proof performance measure with a risk aversion parameter of 3. The shaded areas depict the 5% upper and 95% lower
confidence bounds. The risk factors are the market excess rate of return (MKTRF) and the size (SMB), growth (HML), momentum (MOM), momentum reversal (LTR),
liquidity (TRADELIQ) and lookback straddles return (LOOKBACK) factors.
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consistently significant for top performing funds, whereas mediocre
performing funds have at least five significant risk factors. Specifically,
top performing funds have a statistically significant market risk and
momentum factor at all three quantiles clearly stating that these factors
are significant throughout a broad range of the distribution of top
performing hedge fund returns and not just at the mean. In contrast,
mediocre quantile funds also have statistically significant liquidity,
SMB, HML factors at all three quantiles. This clearly suggests that
mediocre funds accept more sources of systematic risk than top per-
forming funds. Moreover, replying on illiquid assets to achieve per-
formance is a prevalent feature of mediocre performing funds whereas
this is a significant factor for top performing funds only at the highest
75th quintile. The volatility factor is significant only for top performing
funds at the higher 75th quintile suggesting that only the top perfor-
mers can benefit from volatility. Interestingly, the momentum reversal
factor is significantly negative for the lower 25th quintile of mediocre
performing funds implying that these funds “give up” some of the
earlier momentum profits. This is in accordance with the theory pro-
posed by Vayanos and Woolley (2013) who model momentum and
momentum reversal because of gradual order flows in response to
shocks in investment returns. This suggests that at the 25th quintile,
mediocre funds do not quickly change their strategy when it starts to
fail.
Figs. 1 and 2 provide a graphical view of the marginal effects of the
risk factors on excess returns. Figs. 1 and 2 correspond to the estimates
in Table 6, but the estimates are reported for every risk quantile τ, with
0 ≤ τ≤ 1. The bold line in Fig. 1 shows the response for the risk factors
for top performing funds, six months out of sample and Fig. 2 shows the
same for mediocre performing funds. The boundaries of the shaded area
indicate the 5% upper and 95% lower bootstrap envelope. Each graph
in the figures depict the relation between the size of the coefficient and
the risk quantile of a given risk factor for a given performance quintile
as measured by the manipulation proof performance measure with a
risk aversion parameter of 3.
In Fig. 1, the second graph shows that for top performing funds Ft, 5,
as the market risk quantile of MKTRFt increases, the beta response
coefficient increases at the extremes. This implies that performance for
top funds is more sensitive to a one unit increase in market risk at the
tails of the distribution of market risk. Moreover, the coefficient for
market risk is always positive and statistically significant because zero
is outside the confidence interval. Similarly, Fig. 1 shows that the MOM
effect for top funds is significantly positive for all but the very lowest
quantiles. Looking at TRADEDLIQ and LOOKBACK factors we see that
these coefficients become positive from about the 60th percentile and
higher.
Looking at Fig. 2, we see that mediocre performing funds F3, behave
like top performing funds F5, in that the MKTRF and MOM factors are
always positive and except for MOM at the extreme quantiles, statisti-
cally significant. The three additional factors significant for mediocre
funds, SMB, HML and TRADELIQ are positive and statistically sig-
nificant throughout a broad range of quantiles where the coefficients
SMB and HML tend to decline and become less significant for the
highest quantiles. Meanwhile, LTR clear rises by quantile from negative
and significant for quantiles below 0.4 to positive but insignificant at
the higher quantiles suggesting that one reason why mediocre per-
forming funds perform less well is their inability to close out losing
Fig. 2. Marginal effects of risk factors on excess returns for mediocre performing funds. Each graph in the above figure depicts the relation between the size and the
significance of the coefficient and the quantile of a given risk factor for mediocre performing funds as measured by the manipulation proof performance measure with
a risk aversion parameter of 3. The shaded areas depict the 5% upper and 95% lower confidence bounds. The risk factors are the market excess rate of return (MKTRF)
and the size (SMB), growth (HML), momentum (MOM), momentum reversal (LTR), liquidity (TRADELIQ) and lookback straddles return (LOOKBACK) factors.
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positions in a timely manner. In contrast, Fig. 1 reveals that top per-
forming funds never have a statistically significant LTR at any quantile.
Finally, we estimate the time varying coefficients for Eq. (6). This
will allow us to investigate the evolution of the estimated coefficients
over time and so investigate how the risk profile of hedge funds adjust
as we approach and move through the 2007–08 financial crisis. To
avoid clutter, we focus on the conditional median equation (i.e. the
50th quantile) in Eq. (6).
We examine how the risk profiles of top and mediocre hedge funds
change over time by running rolling quantile regressions. Figs. 3 and 4
plot the estimates of the coefficients of Eq. (6) for each month using a
12-month constant size window. Fig. 3 reports the results for top
quintile funds together with the 95% confidence envelope and Fig. 4
reports the same for mediocre hedge funds. For top performing funds,
Fig. 3 shows that the confidence envelope of the market risk and the
momentum factors widen in 2006 and early 2007 and then subse-
quently narrow suggesting that these risk factors were subject to greater
uncertainty in the run up to the recent financial crisis. Meanwhile for
mediocre performing funds, Fig. 4 shows that the confidence envelops
for market risk and momentum factors also widen in 2006 but unlike
top performing funds, the confidence envelope does not narrow during
the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the confidence envelops for the SMB
and HML factors for mediocre performing funds also widen prior to the
financial crisis period but remain wide during the 2008 recession. The
confidence envelope for liquidity widens and the coefficient turns ne-
gative during the 2007 liquidity crisis. Together, these finding suggest
that top performing hedge funds have a risk profile that anticipates
growing economic risks whereas mediocre hedge funds have a risk
profile that includes factors that are coincident with systematic risk,
reacting rather than anticipating growing economic uncertainty. While
these results are in line with Kacperczyk et al. (2014) who find that
market timing is a task that only skilled managers can perform, we also
discover, evidently, which systematic risk factors top funds accept and
which systematic factors they avoid in achieving top performance.
6. Return smoothing and its implication for performance analysis
of hedge funds
The analysis in Section 4 was conducted assuming that due to their
highly dynamic complex nature, hedge fund returns exhibit a high
degree of non-normality, fat tails, excess kurtosis and skewness which
invalidate the traditional mean-variance framework of Markowitz
(1959). Our assumption is validated in Table 3, where it is shown that
the unconditional distribution of hedge funds is far from the normal
distribution.
A possible drawback of the stochastic dominance analysis con-
ducted in Section 4 is that preserving the characteristics of the data may
not control for the issue of returns smoothing. As stressed by
Getmansky, Lo, and Markarov (2004), hedge fund managers might in-
vest in illiquid securities for which market prices are not readily
available. In this case reported returns may be smoother than real
economic returns. This leads to underestimating true return volatility
and overestimating performance persistence. In a related work Stulz
(2007) suggests that managers have discretion in the valuation of their
assets under management. In other words, managers use performance
smoothing to signal consistency and low risk profiles of their hedge
funds. To test if serial autocorrelation in hedge funds returns is a source
of performance, we replicate the analysis in Tables 4 and 5 testing the
same hypotheses, but this time the performance measures are calcu-
lated using “unsmoothed” rather than the observed series of returns.
Fig. 3. Time variation of the risk factors for top performing funds.
Using a 12 month rolling window, these figures show the time varying estimated coefficients of the risk factors in Eq. (7) and their upper and lower bounds that
explains the six month out of sample net excess rate of return for the top quintile performing fund of fund hedge funds according to the manipulation proof
performance measure with a risk aversion parameter of 3. The risk factors are the market excess rate of return (MKTRF) and the size (SMB), growth (HML),
momentum (MOM), momentum reversal (LTR), liquidity (TRADELIQ) and lookback straddles returns (LOOKBACK). The rolling time varying R2 (R SQUARED)
coefficients are also reported.
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Similarly, we also repeat the quantile regressions of Table 6 using un-
smoothed data. We do not report the results using unsmoothed data for
the stochastic dominance tests for persistence shown in Table 5 and the
quantile regressions reported in Table 6 as the results are unchanged.8
The stochastic dominance tests examining whether hedge funds out-
perform the market are somewhat different however and deserve some
additional attention.
The approach we follow to unsmooth the observed returns is based
on the methodology suggested by Getmansky et al. (2004). The method
assumes that the observed return in period t (Xt) is a weighted average
of the “true” returns, Xt∗, over the most recent ξ +1 periods, including
the current period:= + + …+X X X X ,t t t t0 1 1
with two conditions= …[0, 1], 0, , ,
= + + …+1 .0 1
The parameter θ can be estimated by maximum likelihood. Once the
parameters θγ have been estimated, the “true” return Xt∗ is obtained by
calculating
= …X X X X .t t t t1 1
0 (8)
A recurring application of the formula in Eq. (8) on the observed
returns provides a series of corrected returns which is free of serial
correlation (see Getmansky et al., 2004 for more details).
Once the unsmoothed returns have been obtained the stochastic
dominance tests and the quantile regressions were repeated. Panels A, B
and C in Table 7 repeat the results of the stochastic dominance test for
superior performance of hedge funds over the S&P 500, Russel 2000
and MSCI indexes respectively using unsmoothed data. As in Table 4,
for each panel, we test whether the fund of fund and all hedge funds
first and second order dominate the candidate benchmark in columns
three to six. As in Table 4, the p-values in Table 7 were obtained using
the bootstrap method. However, the block bootstrap method described
in Section 4 is not suitable for data that are not correlated. For this
reason, the algorithm used to calculate the empirical p-values is based
on the wild bootstrap method (see for example Davidson & Flachaire,
2008).
Panels A, B and C in Table 7 shows very little evidence that hedge
funds have outperformed the market. In fact, we find that the market,
as defined by the small cap dominated Russel 2000 index outperforms
rather than underperforms hedge funds. This suggests that our earlier
finding that hedge finds outperform the small cap dominated Russel
2000 index could be an artifact of return smoothing. Meanwhile the
results for the S&P500 and the MSCI indexes in Table 7 are, like those
for the smoothed data of Table 4, inconclusive.
In any event, that despite the declining returns suffered by the
hedge fund industry in recent years, the weight of evidence presented
here suggests that the hedge fund industry performed as well as the
market. This conclusion is consistent with Bali et al. (2013) who find
that the fund of fund hedge fund strategy does not outperform the S&
P500 according to the MPPM.
Fig. 4. Time variation of the risk factors for mediocre performing funds.
Using a 12 month rolling window, these figures show the time varying estimated coefficients of the risk factors in Eq. (7) and their upper and lower bounds hat
explains the six month out of sample net excess rate of return for the third (mediocre) quintile performing fund of fund hedge funds according to the manipulation
proof performance measure with a risk aversion parameter of 3. The risk factors are the market excess rate of return (MKTRF) and the size (SMB), growth (HML),
momentum (MOM), momentum reversal (LTR), liquidity (TRADELIQ) and lookback straddles returns (LOOKBACK). The rolling time varying R2 (R SQUARED)
coefficients are also reported.
8 The results obtained by repeating the analysis of Tables 5 and 6 using un-
smoothed data is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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7. Conclusions
Despite the declining returns from hedge fund investment, our
stochastic dominance tests find that hedge funds did not perform worse
than the market. Unlike Capocci et al. (2005) and Slavutskaya (2013),
we find evidence that the superior performance of top quintile hedge
funds does persist according to the MPPM, but only for six months ra-
ther than for two or three years as reported by Boyson (2008), Gonzalez
et al. (2016) and Ammann et al. (2013). It is important to note that
these results hold under very general conditions as we do not assume
i.i.d. distributed data and they apply even when the data is character-
ized by serial dependence and heteroscedasticity.
Holding alpha performance constant, we find evidence that top
funds accept a distinctly different risk profile than mediocre funds,
suggesting that top funds follow strategies that mediocre performing
hedge funds are unable or unwilling to emulate. Specifically, we in-
vestigate whether the risk profile of hedge funds differ by quintile by
performing a quantile regression on out of sample net excess returns on
the Carhart (1997) model augmented by momentum reversal, traded
liquidity risk and volatility. The augmented Carhart (1997) model finds
that out of sample excess returns of top quintile funds are positively
associated with market risk and with momentum at the 25th, 50th and
75th quantiles that appear to anticipate growing economic risk. How-
ever, excess returns for mediocre performing funds are, in addition to
market risk and momentum factors, significantly associated with three
other factors, the SMB and HML Fama French factors as well as li-
quidity, that appear to react rather than anticipate the difficult eco-
nomic conditions that evolved after 2006. The positive association with
liquidity suggests that at least some of the returns from investment in
these funds are premiums from holding illiquid assets. Moreover, there
is a significant inverse association with momentum reversal at the
lower quantiles of mediocre performing funds, suggesting that some of
the returns earned from momentum are lost as these funds are slow to
change a losing strategy. Interestingly, the excess returns on top per-
forming funds at the 75th quantile are also significantly associated with
liquidity and volatility risks, hinting that the very best of the top per-
forming funds could be successfully following a more refined strategy
explaining why these funds are the very best performers.
We conclude that, holding alpha performance constant, superior
performing hedge funds can be following a different strategy than
mediocre performing funds as they have a distinctly different risk
profile. Evidently, top performing funds earn risk premiums by ac-
cepting fewer sources of systematic risks that anticipate growing risks.
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